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Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics:
Introductiont
ROGER B. DWORKIN*
Academic year 1992-93 was a year of celebration at Indiana University. The
year was both the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the Indiana University
School of Law in Bloomington and the twentieth anniversary of the Univer-
sity's Poynter Center for the Study of Ethics and American Institutions.
While intellectual anniversaries are harder to verify than institutional ones,
one could argue that 1992-93 was also the twenty-fifth anniversary of
bioethics. Surely, it was the twenty-fifth anniversary of a seminal symposium
in the U.C.L.A. Law Review,' which introduced many of us to the field.
This happy coincidence of birthdays led naturally to a conference and
symposium about bioethics sponsored jointly by the law school and the
Poynter Center. The two institutions have a long and happy history of
collaboration in many areas, and the opportunity to celebrate major anniversa-
ries together was too attractive to resist. Because both institutions devote
substantial attention to bioethics, that subject seemed a natural for this joint
venture.
Not surprisingly, the twenty-five year-old field of bioethics is in ferment.
The problems of bioethics-issues about abortion, assisted reproduction,
allowing patients to die, the human implications of genetic advances, control
of research, and others-guarantee that the field will always involve
controversy. Today, however, another kind of ferment is also evident, as the
field itself questions its assumptions and methods. Thus, a logical set of
inquiries for the conference and symposium involved the future direction of
bioethics scholarship itself: How should bioethics be done? What are the
paradigms that have guided us to date, and how satisfactory are they for
ongoing analysis?
To explore those questions we brought together a remarkable group of
scholars from a variety of disciplines-from outside Bloomington, two
philosophers and two law professors, and from our own university, two law
professors, a philosopher, two religious medical ethicists, a biologist, a
psychologist, and a sociologist. The results, which are presented in the pages
that follow, were truly outstanding.
t © 1994 by Roger B. Dworkin. All rights reserved.
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PRINCIPLES AND CASES
If any work in bioethics may be said to be truly paradigmatic, it is Tom L.
Beauchamp's and James Childress' seminal Principles of Biomedical Ethics.2
The first paper in this symposium is by Tom L. Beauchamp of Georgetown
University, one of the authors of that classic work.
In his Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, Professor
Beauchamp defends the role of principle-based decision-making in bioethics.
He asserts that principles are stronger than rules of thumb, but weaker than
absolute requirements. They are firm obligations that can be set aside only
when they conflict with and do not override another obligation. Beauchamp
briefly describes the four principles that he and Childress see as the bases of
bioethical decision-making: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and
justice, principles which Beauchamp argues are drawn from "the common
morality" based on social conventions and historical traditions.
Professor Beauchamp specifically recognizes that principles must be filled
out and refined if they are to solve real problems. Judgment and decision-
making are essential, and they should be accomplished by balancing principles
against other moral considerations in a manner similar to John Rawls'
"reflective equilibrium." No canonical content exists for bioethics.
In the second half of his paper, Professor Beauchamp discusses three
approaches that are often seen as alternatives to a bioethics based on
principles-casuistry, virtue theory, and "Dartmouth Descriptivism." He finds
much to praise in each approach but, ultimately, he finds each lacking as a
basis for biomedical ethics. Nonetheless, he concludes that the alternative
theories are not alternatives after all but, instead, can coexist with the
principled approach.
Casuistry, or case-by-case decision-making, is perhaps the most serious
challenger to principlism. Ultimately, casuistry fails as a system, Professor
Beauchamp argues, because it needs some values, that is, principles, to permit
it to resolve cases. Virtue theory, which emphasizes character rather than
actions, cannot tell us what course of conduct to adopt in a difficult situation,
although a truly ethical person will engage in right action because he wants
to, given his virtuous character. "Dartmouth Descriptivism" emphasizes the
creation of specific rules of right conduct rather than more general principles.
Professor Beauchamp admits that principles must be made specific and turned
into rules to actually govern conduct, but he rejects the possibility of creating
a universal canon of rules of conduct or a "'single unified ethical theory."'
Professor Beauchamp notes in conclusion that assigning priority to one
bioethical theory is a "suspicious project" and states that bioethics based on
principles is consistent with many types of ethical theory.
David H. Smith, Professor of Religious Studies and Director of the Poynter
Center at Indiana University, and Karen Hanson, Professor of Philosophy at
the University, commented on Professor Beauchamp's paper. While generally
2. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (3d ed. 1989).
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quite sympathetic to Professor Beauchamp's approach, Professor Smith raises
three important criticisms. First, he questions Professor Beauchamp's rejection
of an overriding "super principle." Adoption of a super principle (such as
Utilitarianism or Kantianism) is not inconsistent with flexibility, and it would
offer Beauchamp some defense against critics who see his approach, grounded
in the common morality, as necessarily conservative or a captive of trends,
intuition, or cultural blindness.
Second, Professor Smith asks why the four principles Professor Beauchamp
adopts are the right four principles. He notes the need for attention to the
method of reasoning used in identifying the dominant principles.
Finally, Professor Smith notes that the heavy emphasis on principles makes
it hard to pay attention to the role of perspective or vision in the moral life
and in the formation of character. Principles tend to push questions of
accurate description to the background.
Professor Hanson emphasizes even more heavily the importance of
perspective and accurate description. She suggests that Professor Beauchamp
underestimates the distinctive claims of the non principle-based paradigms,
especially casuistry. She says that Professor Beauchamp overstates the
distinction between fact and value, between is and ought. Casuists recognize
that thick concepts like "courage" or "lie" mark the intersection of fact and
value and that filling in facts and descriptions leads to conclusions. The same
is true of the distinction between means and ends. Both means and ends and
facts and values exist along acontinuum. Constantly reassessing our views of
ends by observing them in real life situations requires us to reappraise the
means used to achieve those ends and the consequences of pursuing them.
That appraisal, which blends fact and value, is, Professor Hanson suggests,
"both action-guiding and the heart of our justificatory enterprise." She notes
that Professor Beauchamp offers no competing methodology for reaching
ethical conclusions based on principles.
Professor Hanson also notes a problem with Professor Beauchamp's
treatment of virtue theory. Beauchamp seems to imply that we cannot evaluate
character without principles for evaluation. Yet this seems overstated because
it is not true either that good motives lead always to good actions (even the
actions that Beauchamp's principles would require) or that good actions
always reflect good motives or good character.
Most importantly, however, principles rooted in the common morality can
often lead to actions that seem clearly inappropriate when subjected to
judgment. Professor Smith's gentle reference to claims that Professor
Beauchamp's approach may be criticized for conservatism or cultural
blindness, is given poignancy and force by Professor Hanson, who reminds us
that norms based on social conventions and historical traditions have given us
the Tuskeegee syphilis studies and a research system that has virtually ignored
the health needs of women. The point is that we need good judgments about
questions of bioethics. Whether these judgments must be principled, Professor
Hanson suggests, remains an open question.
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
As Professor Beauchamp's paper and the comments to it make plain,
casuistry represents perhaps the major competitor to a bioethics based on
principle. Professor John Arras has long been one of the leading exponents of
casuistry. His paper, Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, deftly explores the
limitations of principlism and traces the emergence of casuistical and
narrative-based alternatives.
Cases have always been an important part of bioethical analysis. In the early
days of principlism, however, many writers saw the relation between
principles and cases as one directional. Principles were applied down to the
facts of cases to reach "right" results. The cases were defined by professionals
(doctors, nurses, etc.), and were usually "thin," that is, lacking in rich
description and detail. Professor Arras argues that this approach to solving
biomedical problems cannot work. It is both insufficiently theoretical and too
mechanistic. What is needed instead is a dialectical or reciprocal relationship
between principles and cases that allows one to reach reflective equilibrium.
Professor Arras doubts that principlism can lead to determinate answers to
real problems. First, principles must be interpreted; not only is their meaning
not self-evident, but culture necessarily influences the interpretation of
principles. Principles mean different things in different cultures. Second,
principles conflict, and their conflict requires interpretation. Third, in order
to apply principles to cases, types of cases must be interpreted. "Cases and
issues must be described, individuated, and labelled well before any principles
can be imposed on them." Finally, the particular case one is exploring must
be interpreted. For example, in order to deal with a patient whose words
request that treatment be withdrawn, we must interpret the words in context
to understand whether they are really a request for action or an inquiry about
the concern care givers have for the patient. Interpretation at each of these
four levels involves conflict. Professor Arras argues that to talk of applying
principles masks the need to do the hard work that ethical analysis truly
requires. Doing that hard work requires that we abandon the idea that moral
justification represents a correspondence between individual judgments and
theoretically validated moral principles. Instead we should adopt a conception
based on the coherence of case-based judgments, mid-level principles, and
theoretical and cultural commitments. We should ask "how a particular action
or policy comports with considered judgments, principles, and values already
embedded in the web of our collective moral life." This more "particularist"
approach is best represented by casuistry.
Professor Arras then describes casuists as persons who contend that
whatever right a principle may have in relation to competing principles must
be determined not in the abstract, but in response to the particularities of
individual cases. Casuistry is like the common law in that it reasons from the
bottom (facts) up, not from the top (principles) down. For the casuist moral
certainty rests in the response to cases. While "hard-core" casuists reject
principles altogether, most casuists see their task as fitting abstract principles
to the facts of particular cases; thus, casuistry and principlism need not be as
antithetical as is often claimed.
[Vol. 69:945
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Because of the importance of facts, the most useful cases are narratives,
fully developed stories that offer a richness of detail. Using cases, especially
well-developed narratives, as the basic tool of moral analysis not only
provides the considered judgments from which principles evolve, but also
provides the judgments that can test the principles. Cases are a way to learn
how to perceive, comprehend, and judge ethically. Their use develops skills
in moral diagnosis, discernment of particularities, analogical reasoning,
judicious weighing and balancing, and practical strategies for coping with risk
and uncertainty.3
Professor Arras then concludes his very thoughtful paper by presenting an
example of a narrative that provides a basis for ethical analysis and by noting
one additional feature and two problems of particularism. He observes that
particularist paradigms point to the social group as the foundation of moral
truth, and he recognizes that this poses two problems for particularism: What
are we to do about challenges to received wisdom; and what is the relevance
in ethical analysis of the existence of different communities and cultures?
Professors Richard Miller of Indiana University's Religious Studies
Department and Susan Williams of its School of Law responded to Professor
Arras' paper. Professor Miller, while generally sympathetic to Arras'
approach, raises three questions about it. First, he questions whether narrative
is as useful for developing casuistry as Professor Arras suggests. Casuistry
exists to respond to doubt and perplexity, while narrative is offered as an
antidote to doubt and perplexity. That is, casuistry functions when one is
separated or alienated from knowledge of how to act. Narrative provides unity
throughout life that prevents this alienation from arising. Thus narrative is an
antidote to practical reasoning, not a tool for doing it.
Secondly, Professor Miller suggests that paradigm cases and analogical
reasoning are the essence of casuistry. Narrative, by relying on thick
description, makes the creation of paradigm cases from which one can reason
analogically an interminable process. Narratives hinder, rather than promote,
the casuistic enterprise.
Finally, Professor Miller suggests a criticism of casuistry that is similar to
a criticism of principlism that we have already seen and that Professor Arras
anticipated at the end of his paper. By basing its analysis on paradigm cases
upon which the parties to the discourse agree, casuistry runs the risk of
conservatism, limited perspective, and bias, by failing to inquire who may be
included as a party to the discourse.
Professor Williams suggests that a narrative-based ethics raises a still larger
challenge to common understanding. It suggests a new epistemology that in
turn affects our view of ethics. Williams observes that conventional western
3. Whether wittingly or not, Professor Arras has, in a very few pages, presented a persuasive
rationale for both the common law and the law schools' use of the case method of instruction. When
both are increasingly under attack by proponents of political solutions to everything and the replacement
of traditional law school methods with those of countless other disciplines, it is interesting to note that




Cartesian epistemology proceeds from five basic assumptions: (1) reality is
objective; (2) it is accessible to human knowledge; (3) people seek knowledge
individually, rather than as members of social groups; (4) reason is the
primary faculty for gaining knowledge; and (5) knowledge is universal.
Theory-based systems of ethics, like those discussed by Professor Arras, are
rooted in Cartesian epistemology.
Narrative-based ethics, on the other hand, do not rest on oa Cartesian
foundation. The alternative epistemology, embraced by narrative, rejects each
assumption of the Cartesians: knowledge is contextual and cultural, not
objective; reason is an insufficient tool for acquiring knowledge because
values must be used to choose between competing interpretations; individuals
gain knowledge as members of a cultural group; knowledge need not be
universal-there may be many truths. The fully developed narratives of which
Professor Arras speaks reflect this alternative epistemology.
Professor Williams notes that the non-Cartesian epistemology is especially
important for an ethics that is applied to science. Modern western science is
Cartesian. Therefore, applying narrative ethics to it involves using a method
"that undermines the understanding of practitioners about the knowledge
claims of their own disciplines." That is, ethics challenges epistemology. As
the relationship between epistemology and ethics is reciprocal, the opposite
can also be true: a shift in epistemology may have ethical implications.
AUTONOMY
Autonomy, one of Professor Beauchamp's four principles, has enjoyed
special prominence in bioethical analysis and in American medical law.
Professors John Robertson of the University of Texas School of Law and Carl
Schneider of the University of Michigan Law School presented papers that in
quite different ways challenge the apparent hegemony of the autonomy
principle.
. John Robertson has, for many years, been one of the leading legal scholars
devoting attention to the role of law in dealing with biomedical advances. His
paper, Posthumous Reproduction, continues his valuable contribution to the
field. In Posthumous Reproduction, Professor Robertson explores the role of
autonomy in resolving dilemmas posed by the possibility of intentional
reproduction after one or both genetic parents are dead-for example, through
artificial insemination, surrogate motherhood, or the maintenance of brain
dead women for the purpose of carrying fetuses to term. He argues that in
these cases autonomy should not be given automatic or determinative priority.
Unless we are simply to say that every exercise of procreational autonomy is
to be protected,4 we must make normative judgments about the importance
of the interests at stake in the choice. Autonomy can provide no guidance for
making that choice.




Professor Robertson argues that the right to control posthumous reproduc-
tion follows from the principle of procreational autonomy only if posthumous
reproduction implicates the same interests, values, and concerns that
reproduction normally entails. The value of posthumous reproduction to an
individual rests in the importance to that individual, when alive, of giving
directions about the fate of his or her reproductive products. Autonomy cannot
answer the question of how important that ability is.
Robertson argues that the interest in controlling reproduction after one's
death is highly attenuated. It is much weaker, for example, than the interests
in passing property through wills or controlling features of one's death
through a living will. Professor Robertson then demonstrates this point and the
limited usefulness of autonomy by working through detailed sets of scenarios
about the posthumous use of sperm, frozen embryos, and brain dead or
comatose women. He concludes that directions for or against posthumous
reproduction deserve much less respect than decisions about reproduction
when one is alive and that a claim of autonomy marks the beginning, not the
end, of the inquiry.
Professor Fred Cate of the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington
responded to Professor Robertson. Professor Cate agrees with Professor
Robertson that the experience of bearing and raising children means more to
the living than to the dead and that a focus on autonomy cannot resolve
questions about the importance of reproductive experiences. However, he
argues that it is not clear that normative judgments about the experience of
child rearing and the legal right to bear or to avoid bearing children tell us
much about the importance of autonomy in the analysis of posthumous
reproduction.
Cate argues that Professor Robertson overstates the social importance of
wills and advance directives to withhold or withdraw health care from dying
persons and that he is incorrect in believing that constitutional protection for
property and end-of-life decision-making is based on social utility. Wills and
advance directives, Cate says, enhance the rights of individuals to do
nonsocial things in the service of their autonomy. So too, he argues, autonomy
supports the right to make decisions about posthumous reproduction.
Professor Cate then uses organ transplantation policy as evidence that the
autonomy to make bad decisions or to avoid decision-making altogether is
valued more than sound decisions. He argues that we must recognize the
breadth and power of autonomy and consider alternate values before we
conclude that autonomy is a value we can no longer afford.
Professor Carl Schneider of the University of Michigan Law School, who
has long been a persuasive critic of the excesses of rights thinking, then
presents an insightful critique of the dominance of autonomy in the modern
approach to bioethics in his paper, Bioethics with a Human Face. Professor
Schneider is careful to note that he does not reject the importance of
autonomy or suggest that autonomy has no place in bioethical analysis. He
simply questions the hegemony that autonomy has been accorded and the
militancy with which some of its proponents insist upon its dominance.
1994]
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Professor Schneider begins by noting the extreme abstraction of most
bioethics literature. That literature reflects what Schneider calls "hyper
rationalism." Schneider defines hyper rationalism as an approach that
substitutes reason for information and analysis and that proceeds on the
assumption that people behave in highly rational ways-that they deliberate
rationally about their situations in order to autonomously serve clearly
worked-out agendas. Schneider notes that a hyper rational approach to
bioethical issues has led to the triumph of the autonomy paradigm. He
suggests that empirical evidence may well lead in a different direction.
Professor Schneider then reviews some of the existing empirical evidence.
He concludes that that evidence suggests that while patients want to be
informed about their medical situations, at least a substantial number do not
want to make their own medical decisions or, perhaps, even to participate in
them in any significant way. Those persons' views and attitudes are important
even if the persons who hold them are only a minority of patients and
potential patients. Schneider rightly decries the tendency to treat majority
preference as if it were everybody's preference and reminds us of the
importance of avoiding the tyranny of the majority.
Professor Schneider freely concludes that existing empirical studies are
incomplete, inconclusive, and, sometimes, flawed. Nonetheless, he believes
they provide important evidence about people's attitudes, evidence which is
supported by other information as well. All of this evidence is "highly
suggestive but hardly unequivocal." It raises or leaves open questions about
how much and what kinds of information patients want; of how much power
patients wish to retain; and to whom they want to cede authority.
Schneider concludes by suggesting that the existing studies demonstrate
ways in which empirical research can raise important questions about the
autonomy paradigm. The paradigm needs to be refined. Professor Schneider
sets out some of the questions that must be resolved in the process of refining
the paradigm, and notes that his own research agenda is addressing the kinds
of empirical evidence necessary to undertake that refinement.
Professors Peter Cherbas of Indiana University's Biology Department and
Bernice Pescosolido from Indiana University's Sociology Department
commented on Professor Schneider's paper. Although neither mentioned the
word "epistemology," both of their comments shared a great deal with
Professor Williams' response to Professor Arras' paper. Like Professor
Williams, both Professor Cherbas and Professor Pescosolido challenged our
entire way of thinking about bioethics.
Professor Cherbas considers what it means to talk about paradigms in
bioethics and about autonomy as a paradigm. He is struck by the narrowness
of bioethical inquiry, by its virtual limitation to medical ethics, and, even
more narrowly, to the doctor-patient relationship.
Cherbas traces this strange narrowness of bioethical inquiry to the
discipline's efforts to develop in the way that-science develops-through the
creation of paradigms of normal science that are occasionally shaken by
[Vol. 69:945
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revolutions that replace old paradigms with new ones.5 As Kuhn, who
described this method of growth, recognized, the method is inappropriate for
disciplines like law and ethics that are characterized by the effort to respond
to great social need.
Disciplines like bioethics should be characterized by analysis. However, in
its eagerness to provide answers to specific problems in the manner of a
science, bioethics has developed what Professor Cherbas calls the "autonomy
algorithm": "Analysis may allot full measures of respect to a variety of values
and interests, but disputes will be resolved in favor of patient autonomy." On
this view, Professor Schneider's paper may be seen as a search for a modified
algorithm.
Professor Cherbas argues that there is something illegitimate about a
paradigm-driven bioethics. The methods of science, he says, are ill-suited to
the public needs of the healing professions. The paradigm-driven, scientific
approach to bioethics has resulted in a lack of ethical guidance for individuals
and families who are not professionals. The focus on autonomy has become
a focus on procedures and a recognition of patients' rights but has failed to
offer individuals and families guidance about how to exercise their rights.
Professor Cherbas suggests that bioethics needs new perspectives more than
new paradigms, and he concludes by reminding us that bioethicists are not
scientists-they are philosophers.
Professor Pescosolido suggests broadening the inquiry even further. She
notes that both biomedicine and bioethics are socially constructed phenomena,
and she calls for extending Professor Schneider's synthesis of intellectual
debate and empirical reality in three ways, each of which she explores
succinctly.
Understanding bioethics requires first that we link consideration of
biomedicine and bioethics to larger structures of power and cultural values to
place them into their historical context and to understand them as part of a
social contract that was struck early in the industrial age to allocate power in
dealing with issues of health.
Second, we must understand that the problems with autonomy are caused
not only by the differences between what people say they want and what
bioethicists claim people want, which Schneider exposed, but also by a
questionable underlying view of the way individuals make decisions. The
rational calculus model, on which the autonomy paradigm rests, may well not
represent the reality of human decision-making. Indeed, Professor Pescosolido
suggests that the model of rational patient choice based on information may
be ndive.
Finally, we should question the utility of autonomy because it may be ill-
suited to deal with the problems or issues that confront us at the beginning of
the twenty-first century. Professor Pescosolido suggests that autonomy may
be yesterday's issue, and that striving toward more communitarian approaches
to questions of values may be the wave of the future.




Of course, no single conference can hope to solve the methodological
problems of bioethics. Nonetheless, a remarkable pattern emerged from our
collection of very diverse scholars. A review of their collected papers and
commentaries makes plain several features of a useful and rewarding bioethics
for the twenty-first century. First, a sound approach to bioethics will require
the consideration of principles and cases. Second, no one value can properly
be allowed to dominate the field. Third, the value of autonomy has been
greatly overemphasized. Autonomy does not solve the problems it promises
to solve; it is unsupported by empirical reality; and it excludes other equally
valuable considerations. Fourth, real progress in bioethics will require us to
expand the scope of inquiry to include the insights of social science about a
wide range of questions. Finally, we may need to rethink the very nature of
the discipline of bioethics. The terms of bioethical inquiry may be too narrow
and too captive to a possibly outmoded world view to permit them to
contribute very much to solving the moral dilemmas medicine will continue
to present.
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